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ABSTRACT 
The European Union has been engaged since 1989 in a programme to develop 
tritium breeding blankets for application in a fusion power reactor. There are four 
concepts under development, namely two of the solid breeder type and two of the 
liquid breeder type. At the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe one blanket concept of 
each line has been pursued so far with the so-called breeder outside tube (BOT) 
type representing the solid breeder line. ln the BOT concept, Li4Si04 is used as 
ceramic breeding material in the form of pebble beds in combination with beryllium 
pebbles serving as neutron multiplier. Breeder and multiplier materials are arranged 
in radial-toroidal layers, separated by cooling plates. The coolant is high pressure 
helium which is circulated in series, at first through the first wall structure and 
subsequently through the cooling plates. 
The safety and environmental impact of the BOT blanket concept has been 
assessed as part of the blanket concept selection exercise, a European concerted 
action aiming at selecting the two most promising concepts for further development. 
The topics investigated are: (a) blanket materials and toxic materials inventory, (b) 
energy sources for mobilisation, (c) fault tolerance, (d) tritium and activation product 
release, and (e) waste generation. No insurmountable safety problems have been 
identified for the BOT concept. The results of the assessment are described in this 
report. Theinformation collected is also intended to serve as input to the EU 'Safety 
and Environmental Assessment of Fusion Iang-term Programme' (SEAL). The 
unresolved issues pertaining to the BOT blanket which need further investigations in 
future programmes are outlined herein. 
Abstract 
Gesichtspunkte der Sicherheit und Umwelteinflüsse 
des heliumgekühlten Feststoffblankets vom Typ BOT 
für einen DEMO Reaktor 
KURZFASSUNG 
Im Fusionsprogramm der Europäischen Union werden seit 1989 tritiumbrütende 
Blankets für den Einsatz in Fusionsreaktoren entwickelt. Bislang befanden sich vier 
Varianten in der näheren Untersuchung, nämlich je zwei Varianten mit festem und 
flüssigem Brutstoff. Im Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe wurden beide Linien verfolgt. 
Für die Linie mit festem Brutstoff ist es das sogenannte BOT-Konzept (englisch für 
breeder outside tube). ln ihm sind Li4Si04 als keramischer Brutstoff in Verbindung 
mit Beryllium zur Neutronenmultiplikation, beide in Form von Kugelschüttungen, 
vorgesehen. Brutstoff und Multiplikator sind in abwechselnden radial-toroidal 
verlaufenden Schichten angeordnet, die durch Kühlplatten voneinander getrennt 
sind. Die ganze Anordnung wird durch gasförmiges Helium gekühlt. Dieses wird 
unter hohem Druck zunächst durch die Kanäle in der ersten Wand und anschließend 
durch solche in den Kühlplatten geleitet. 
Die Sicherheit und Umwelteinflüsse des BOT -Konzeptes wurden im Rahmen des 
europäischen Blankat-Auswahlverfahrens betrachtet, welches zum Ziel hatte, zwei 
der vier Varianten für die weitere Entwicklung auszuwählen. Die dabei behandelten 
Themen waren a) Art und Mengen der beteiligten radiotoxischen Stoffe, b) 
Energieinhalte als mögliche Ursache für Aktivitätsfreisetzungen, c) Störfallverhalten, 
d) Freisatzung von Tritium und anderen Aktivitätsprodukten und e) Erzeugung 
radioaktiver Abfälle. Für das BOT -Konzept wurden wie bei den anderen Varianten 
keine schwerwiegenden Sicherheitsprobleme erkannt. Die Ergebnisse zu den 
untersuchten Themen werden im Bericht dargestellt. Am Schluß werden einige 
Aspekte herausgestellt, die noch weiterer Analysen bedürfen. Das Datenmaterial 
dient auch als Beitrag zu einem laufenden Vierjahresprogramm der EU über 
Sicherheit und Umwelteinflüsse der Fusionstechnologie (SEAL). 
Kurzfassung 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The European Union has been engaged since 1989 in a programme to develop 
tritium breeding blankets for application in fusion power reactors. There are four 
concepts under development. Two of these concepts use Iithium ceramies as 
breeder material (solid breeder blanket), the other two concepts employ a eutectic 
Iead-Iithium alloy as breeder material (liquid metal breeder blanket). 
At the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe one blanket of each line has been pursued so 
far with the so-called breederoutside tube (BOT) type representing the solid breeder 
blanket line. ln the BOT concept, Li4Si04 is used as breeding material in the form of 
pebble beds in combination with beryllium pebbles serving as neutron multiplier. 
8oth breeder and multiplier materials are arranged in alternating radial-toroidal 
layers, separated by cooling plates. These plates equipped with integral cooling 
channels were originally designed as arrays of imbedded cooling tubes, giving the 
concept the name "breeder outside tube". The coolant is high pressure helium, being 
circulated in series, at first through the first wall structure and subsequently through 
the cooling plates in the breeding region. 
The present state of development of the BOT concept is currently being documented 
in a comprehensive status report [1 ]. lt is part of the blanket concept selection 
exercise (BCSE) which aims at selecting two of the four concepts for further 
development. This is a joint effort among the associations developing the four 
concepts and industry under the auspices of the European Commission. The present 
report is essentially a stand-alone version of the contribution to the status report, 
dealing with the safety aspects of the BOThelium cooled solid breeder blanket for a 
DEMO reactor. lt covers the topics (a) blanket materials and toxic materials 
inventory, (b) energy sources for mobilisation, (c) fault tolerance, (d) tritium and 
activation products release, and ( e) waste generation and management. 
ln the frame of the safety and environmental assessment of fusion power long-term 
programme (SEAL) a task (SEAL 6) is being performed on "blanket safety analysis 
for the four European blanket concepts" in support of the BCSE. The task is co-
ordinated by UKAEA. FZK agreed to provide input information under subtask SEAL 
6.2 "Input for the dual coolant blanket and ceramic breeder blanket". Besides the 
above mentioned status report character, this report is also intended to contain the 
necessary information presumably needed in SEAL 6 as far as the BOT concept is 
concerned. ln particular it includes supplemental data and references on mass 
inventories in different regions of the blanket, material composition in radial zones, 
initial impurities in solid materials, afterheat and thermal inertia, energy potentials, 
and cooling circuits. 
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2 BLANKET MATERIALS AND TOXIC MATERIALS INVENTORY 
2.1 Volumes and volume fractions in the blanket segments 
The total volume in different parts of the ceramic breeder blanket and the volume 
fractions of steel, breeder material, beryllium multiplier, primary helium coolant, 
purge helium and void have been calculated for both outboard and inboard blanket. 
The basis for the assessment is the vertical cross section for the DEMO reactor and 
the midplane cross sections of outboard and inboard blanket segments as shown in 
[2]. The main dimensions used in the calculations are displayed in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: MAIN DIMENSIONS OF BLANKET 
ltem length (cm) 
Outboard blanket 
Major radius to first wall at midplane 827.4 
Radius of curvature of first wall (poloidally) 475 
Poloidal angle relative to midplane of circular central blanket part -45.5 to + 45,5 
(degrees) 
Radius of first wall of upper blanket part 643 
Length of upper blanket part 183 
Thickness of first wall/breeding zone/manifold zone 2.5/56.1/41.4 
lnboard blanket 
Radius of first wall at midplane 430 
Length of vertical ( central) blanket part 810 
Length of upper 45 degrees inclined blanket part (top) 238 
Length of lower -45 degrees inclined blanket part (bottom) 238 
Thickness of first wall/breeding zone/manifold and shield zone 2.5/30/53.1 
The computed volumes for the blanket parts ( outboard central plus upper part, and 
inboard central part with upper and lower parts behind the divertors) are listed in 
Table 2. The total blanket volume (all inboard and outboard segments, full toroidal 
coverage) with the dimensions defined in Table 1 results to 823 m3 with volume 
fractions of 35.5/3.7/19.6/15.4/6.9/18.9 percent for steel/breeder/beryllium/primary 
helium/purge helium/void, respectively. The total volume of all outboard blankets 
amounts to 63.5% of the total blanket volume, leaving 36.5% for the inboard. 
The numbers quoted for the breeder and beryllium refer to the pebble volume (not to 
the packed bed volume) assuming a packing factor of 0.623 for the Li4Si04 pebbles 
and 0.808 for the beryllium pebbles [2]. Then the volumes taken from Table 2 and 
multiplied by the material densities of 7700 kg/m3 for steel, 2400 kg/m3 for breeder, 
and 1850 kg/m3 for beryllium yield a 
• total weight of one outboard segment (without shield): 
• total weight of one inboard segment (including shield): 
29.6 tons 
37.5 tons 
A more detailed Iist of the steel volumes in the first wall, breeding zone, and manifold 
zone (respectively manifold plus shield zone for the inboard) is given in Table 3 for 
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each blanket part. Here it can be seen that 51 % of the total steel volume is in the 
outboard and 49 % in the inboard. Most of the steel is located in the manifold zone. 
The percentages in first wall/breeding zone/manifold are 6/35/59 in the outboard. ln 
the inboard the corresponding percentages are 4/17/79. 
Note that the removable shield is not included in the volumes given for the outboard. 
TABLE 2: VOLUME OF SOLID BREEDER BLANKET (in m3) 
Blanket Part Steel Breeder 
Beryl- Primary Purge 
Void Ii um Helium Helium 
Outboard central part 118.6 18.3 96.9 68.5 34.1 95.7 
Outboard upper part 31.2 3.6 19.0 14.8 6.7 15.2 
Outboard total 149.8 21.9 115.9 83.3 40.8 110.9 
lnboard central part 76.8 5.0 26.5 25.0 9.3 25.9 
lnboard upper part 32.7 1.8 9.5 9.2 3.3 9.5 
lnboard lower part 32.7 1.8 9.5 9.2 3.3 9.5 
lnboard total 142.1 8.6 45.5 43.4 16.0 44.9 
Outboard plus lnboard 292.0 30.5 161.4 126.7 56.8 155.8 
total 
Total blanket volume 823.1 
TABLE 3: STEEL VOLUMES IN RADIAL BLANKET ZONES (in m3) 
Blanket section Firstwall Breeding zone Manifold and 
shield 
Outboard central part 6.2 40.6 71.8 
Outboard upper part 2.8 12.4 16.0 
Outboard total 9.0 53.0 87.8 
lnboard central part 3.4 12.5 60.9 
lnboard upper part 1.2 6.0 25.5 
lnboard lower part 1.2 6.0 25.5 
lnboard total 5.7 24.5 111.9 
Outboard plus lnboard total 14.7 77.5 199.7 
Total steel volume in blanket 291.9 
Multiply by the density of 7700 kg/m3 to obtain masses. 
2.2 Coolant inventories 
Coolant inventories in the primary helium cooling circuits of the solid breeder blanket 
have been calculated for the piping added on estimates for other components like 
steam generators, circulators and clean-up systems. 
The loop arrangements and thermal power for the total outboard and inboard blanket 
have been taken as described in [2], accounting for redundancies in the primary 
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circuit Iayout. This Ieads to larger power capacities as compared to the nominal 
power to be removed from the blanket segments. Hence, the loops ( except for the 
feeders connecting the ring collectors and the blanket segments) become I arger than 
they would be required for the nominal power capacity. Table 4 gives an overview of 
the nominal thermal power to be removed by the primary helium circuits from the 
inboard and outboard blanket segments (including the first wall). lt also shows the 
redundancy factors discussed below and the required power capacity of the external 
loops which results from equation 1. As a consequence of this redundant circuit 
Iayout, the external loops (including the ring collectors and the components) have to 
be dimensioned for the case that one circuit of the subsystem has failed (Table 4). 
TABLE 4: THERMAL POWER AND REDUNDANCY FACTORS FOR HELIUM 
COOL/NG CIRCUITS 
Thermal power No. of No. of Redun- Power 
Blanket Region per segment or blanket primary dancy capacity per 
total (MW) segments circuits factor circuit or total (MW) 
Outboard blanket 37.9 48 2x6 1.2 182.1 
lnboard blanket 21.2 32 2x3 1.5 169.8 
Total blanket 2500 80 18 1.28 3204 
The redundancy factor results from the subsystems Iayout as follows: All subsystems 
consisting of n circuits (n=3 or 6) are designed in a 2-out-of-n redundancy, meaning 
that two circuits of a subsystem must fail for the plant to be unavailable. For 
instance, for a 2-out-of-3 subsystem chosen for the inboard to be unavailable, 2 
circuits must fail. Hence, it is available if 1 circuit fails, in which case the remaining 2 
circuits have to take 1.5 times (the redundancy factor) their nominal share. ln the 
same way the redundancy factor of 1.2 corresponds to a 2-out-of-6 subsystem 
chosen for the outboard. 
The required power capacity per circuit (in the event that one circuit of a subsystem 
has failed or is in stand-by) has been calculated by use of the following equation. 
Note that due to the redundancy the overall installad power capacity of the cooling 
system (3204 MW) is 28 % !arger then the nominal power to be removed from the 
blanket (2500 MW). 
where Pcircuit 
Psegment 
nsegment 
ncircuit 
fredundancy 
p = P.egment • n segment • .f 
circuit J redundancy 
11
circuit 
= required power capacity per circuit 
= thermal power per segment 
= number of blanket segments 
= number of installad primary circuits 
= redundancy factor (see Table 4) 
(1) 
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The helium inventory in the primary cooling system has been estimated based on the 
pipe dimensions proposed in [3] and on a first Iayout of the steam generators. For 
the circulators and the clean-up systems a guess has been made. Table 5 
summarises the helium inventory in the different circuit components for the outboard 
and for the inboard blanket, assuming that all circuits are operating simultaneously 
at reduced power. ln this case the total helium inventory would amount to 22000 kg, 
62 % of which would be in the outboard and 38 % in the inboard cooling systems. 
The largest subsystems would thus contain about 7000kg/4000kg of helium 
(outboard/inboard). These rounded numbers will be used for further safety 
considerations. Most of the helium is contained in the pipework (78 % of the 
outboard and 82% of the inboard system's inventory) with only 3 to 4% being in the 
blanket segments. 
Note: lf the redundant circuits (1 out of 6 outboard or 1 out of 3 inboard) were 
isolated from the operating subsystems the inventory in the subsyst would be 
reduced by 11 and 17 %, respectively). 
TABLE 5: HELIUM INVENTORY IN CIRCUIT COMPONENTS 
Component Total Volume TotalMass 
(m3) (kg) 
Outboard, Nominal power 1821 MW 
- Primary helium piping (12 circuits) 1709 10686 
- 48 Blanket segments 83,3 505 
- 12 Steam generators 404 2428 
- 12 Circulators 12 88 
-2 Clean-u_2_ systems 10 50 
Subtotal outboard circuits 2218 13757 
lnboard, Nominal power 679 MW 
- Primary helium piping (6 circuits) 1094 6789 
- 32 Blanket segments 43,4 263 
- 6 Steam generators 194 1163 
- 6 Circulators 6 43.8 
-2 Clean-up systems 5 25 
Subtotal inboard circuits 1342 8283 
Total outboard plus inboard circuits 3560 22041 
2.3 Toxic inventories 
Radioactive inventories in the different regions (inboard, outboard) and radial zones 
(first wall, breeding zone, manifold) of the blanketasweil as in the cooling and purge 
system have been assessed in [2] with supplemental information given in [4]. The 
inventories relevant for safety considerations are summarised below in two 
categories, i.e., tritium (Table 6) and activation products (Table 7). 
2.3. 1 Tritium inventory 
Tritium in breeder: The inventory in Li4Si04 has been calculated from the measured 
residence time for the reference pebbles and is small (R~1 0 g) compared to the tritium 
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generation rate which is of the order of 370 g/d. So the tritium concentration in 
Li4Si04 by weight is on the average 0.14 wppm. 
Tritium in multiplier: The inventory in the beryllium is the largest amounting to 
1278 g at the end of the blanket life time [2]. This is about one third of the tritium 
generated in the beryllium (~3400 g) according to activation calculations [4] and is 
strongly temperature dependent. Most of the tritium generated in the beryllium 
occurs in the outboard center parts (90 % ), only 6 % in the inboard center part, and 
the rest in the upper and lower part of the blanket segments. 
Tritium in structural material: The structural material MANET will receive tritium 
from two sources, i.e., from migration (from the plasma, coolant, purge gas, breeder, 
multiplier) and from transmutations. The first fraction has not been investigated here, 
but is assumed tobe small. The second effect results from FISPACT calculations [4]. 
Presuming that all the tritium generated in the neutron and gamma field is retained in 
the structure, the tritium in the blanket structural material will accumulate to a total of 
12 g after 20000 hours of operation in 2250 tons of steel. This is an average tritium 
concentration by weight of 5.3 wppb. The spatial distribution is very different, 
though, ranging from 75 wppb in the first wall of the outboard central part down to 
0.14 wppb in the manifold zone of the outboard upper part. The corresponding range 
for the inboard is 51 wppb down to 0.4 wppb. Tritium inventariss for different blanket 
regionsandradial zones are given in Table 6. ln any case they are small, amounting 
to 12 g in the entire blanket structure. 
TABLE 6: BLANKET MATERIALSAND TRITIUM INVENTORY 
Blanket zone or system Totalmass Totaltritium 
inventory (tons) inventory (g) 
Breeder material (Li4Si04) OB/IB 52.6/20.6 7/3 
Neutron rnultiplier (beryllium pebbles) OB/18 214/84 1278 (total) 
Structural material (MANET) total OB/18 1153/1095 9.0/3.1 
Firstwall OB/18 69/44 4.0/1.5 
Breeding zone OB/IB 408/189 4.7/0.6 
Manifold and shield zone 08/IB 676/862 0.3/1.1 
Primary coolant (helium) 08/IB 14/8 0.29/0.17 
Purge gas (helium) 0.015 0.1 
08/18 refers to Outboard/lnboard 
Tritium in primary coolant: The H-3 concentration in the helium coolant flow has to 
be kept low in order to minimiss the H-3 Iosses through the steam generators into 
the steam cycle as weil as leaks from the entire cooling system. Therefore, the H-3 
influx into the helium stream (mainly from the first wall, but to some extent also from 
the breeding region) has to be permanently removed in a H-3 extraction unit via a 
bypass flow of typically 0.1 % of the main stream. The equilibrium H-3 concentration 
in the helium loop is a function of the H-3 influx into the helium, the H-3 Iosses from 
the helium circuits (which are relatively small), the extraction efficiency of the H-3 
extraction unit, and the flow rates in the bypass going through the extraction unit. A 
simple parametric study on the equilibrium H-3 concentration as function of the 
above mentioned parameters is given below. 
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The schematic flow diagram is shown in the insert in Figure 1. Mass balance at the 
nodes of the network yields the following equations for the tritium mass 
concentrations at the outlet of the blanket, c2, and at the inlet to the blanket, c1: 
hot leg: (2) 
cold leg: (3) 
where: 
m8 H-3 influx into the main helium stream within the blanket 
m8 H-3 Iosses in the steam generators including leaks from the circuits 
M Helium mass flow rate in the main circuit 
c1, c2 Mass concentration of H-3 in helium at blanket inlet, outlet 
C3, c4 Mass concentration of H-3 in helium at extraction unit inlet, outlet 
e Fraction of M as bypass flow through the extraction unit 
c -c 
a = 
3 4 Extraction efficiency of the H-3 extraction unit 
c3 
ln Figure 1 is plotted the equilibrium H-3 concentration in the hot leg of the helium 
circuit, c2 , vs. the H-3 influx, m8 , into the main helium stream within the blanket with 
the extraction efficiency, a, as parameter. The other parameters (M, s, m8 ) have 
been Chosen as typical for the DEMO ceramic breeder blanket. Since ms << mB the 
H-3 concentration is proportional to the H-3 influx and proportional to the inverse of 
the extraction efficiency, a, and the flow rate in the bypass through the extraction 
unit, s M. There is a large uncertainty in determining the H-3 influx, m8 . A likely 
value is of the order of m8 ~ 3 g/d, but substantially larger values cannot be excluded 
at present. For m8 = 3 g/d and a=O. 7 the equilibrium H-3 concentration in the hot leg 
would be 21 wppb and in the cold leg nearly the same. Hence, the total amount of 
tritium in the primary helium according to Table 6 amounts to 0.46 g which is very 
low. · 
Tritium in purge gas: lt is assumed that the full purge gas flow of approximately 0.6 
kg/s is continuously circulated through the tritium extraction system. The same 
rationale applies as explained for the primary cooling system with the fraction of 
mass flow passing the extraction units s=1 in equation 2. Using again an extraction 
efficiency a=O. 7 and a tritium influx into the purge gas m8 = 370 g/d the equilibrium 
tritium concentration in the purge gas at the blanket outlet would result from equation 
2 to 10 wppm and at the inlet from equation 3 to 3.1 wppm, or approximately 6.6 
wppm on average. This corresponds to a tritium inventory of 0.1 g in an assumed 
helium inventory of 15 kg (about 3 kg in piping, 6 kg in blanket segments, 6 kg in 
extraction components). 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium tritium concentration in the helium cooling system. 
2.3.2 Activation products inventory 
Activation products inventories in the blanket materials (breeder, multiplier, and 
structural material) are reported in detail in [4]. To give an overview of the specific 
and total activity in different regions (outboard, inboard) and radial zones (first wall, 
breeding zone, manifold and shield zone) as referred to in this report the data from 
FISPACT calculations [4] have been reconfigured and are presented below. 
The specific activity taken as the mean of the respective material in different blanket 
regions and radial zones is illustrated in Figure 2 for typical times after shutdown. At 
time zero (after 20000 hours of operation) the specific activity per unit mass is not 
very different among the three blanket materials of the breedin~ zone (breeder, 
multiplier, MANET BZ). lt ranges between about 3x1013 and 1x10 4 Bq/kg. For the 
structural material curves arealso plotted for the first wall (FW) and the manifold and 
shield zone (SH) which differ by about two orders of magnitude. Piease note that the 
value for specific activity in the breeder (Li4Si04) does not include any tritium. ln that 
case it drops by four orders of magnitude within the first year after shutdown, 
whereas for MANET it declines only by a factor of 3 to 8. There is no significant 
difference in the specific values for inboard and outboard. 
The specific activity in beryllium is initially dominated by He-6 which decays rapidly 
(half life 0.8 s). Thereafter the tritium takes the Iead, contributing more than 99 %. 
This implies that all the tritium were trapped in the beryllium. Actually, only about 
one third of the tritium will be retained in the pebbles so that the specific activity in 
the time span of minutes to several 10 years ought to be reduced by half an order of 
magnitude. 
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Figure 2: Specific activity in blanket materials 
The total activity of the blanket materials has been evaluated by multiplying the 
average specific activities for the outboard and inboard plotted in Figure 2 by the 
mass inventories (Table 7). The total activity in the outboard (48 se~ments, all 
materials) after decay times of Os, 1 d, 1 y, 1 Oy, 500y amounts to 8.2x1 01 , 2.8x1 019, 
1.5x1019, 1.7x1018, and 3.9x1014 Bq, respectively. ln the inboard the corresponding 
values reach about 60 % of the outboard values. The numbers quoted for the 
multiplier include the contribution of the tritium as calculated by FISPACT (about 3.4 
kg of tritium in the whole multiplier which is actually too high), whereas for the 
breeder material tritium has been excluded because the amount of tritium being 
retained in the breeder is comparably small. 
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TABLE 7: TOTAL ACTIVITIY IN BLANKET MATERIALS (in Bq) 
Material and region Mass Time after shutdown 
(tons) Os 1 d 1 y 10 y 500 y 
Breeder material, OB 52.6 1 ,4E+18 3,7E+15 1 ,5E+14 1 ,7E+13 2,3E+12 
Breeder materiaiiB 20.6 7,4E+17 2,0E+15 8,2E+13 8,8E+12 1 ,2E+12 
Breeder material OB+IB 73.2 2,2E+18 5,6E+15 2,4E+14 2,6E+13 3,5E+12 
Multiplier (Be), OB 214.4 2,2E+19 9,2E+17 7,4E+17 4,4E+17 3,5E+13 
Multiplier (Be), IB 84.2 1 ,OE+19 4,1E+17 3,4E+17 2,0E+17 1,7E+13 
Multiplier (Be) OB+IB 298.6 3,3E+19 1,3E+18 1,1E+18 6,5E+17 5,1 E+13 
MANET, FW, OB 69.3 2,3E+19 1,2E+19 6,9E+18 6,2E+17 1,1E+14 
MANET, FW, IB 43.9 1 ,3E+19 6,7E+18 3,8E+18 3,4E+17 6,5E+13 
MANET, FW, OB+IB 113.2 3,5E+19 1,9E+19 1,1E+19 9,5E+17 1 ,8E+14 
MANET, BZ, OB 408.1 3,1E+19 1 ,3E+19 6,4E+18 5,8E+17 1 ,9E+14 
MANET, BZ, IB 188.7 1,9E+19 7,6E+18 3,8E+18 3,4E+17 1 ,2E+14 
MANET, BZ, IB+OB 596.8 4,9E+19 2,0E+19 1 ,OE+19 9,2E+17 3,1E+14 
MANET, SH, OB 676.1 4,7E+18 1 ,4E+18 5,2E+17 5,9E+16 4,9E+13 
MANET, SH, IB 861.6 7,5E+18 2,4E+18 9,4E+17 1 ,OE+17 7,7E+13 
MANET, SH; OB+IB 1537.7 1 ,2E+19 3,9E+18 1 ,5E+18 1 ,6E+17 1 ,3E+14 
All materials OB 1420.4 8,2E+19 2,8E+19 1,5E+19 1 ,7E+18 3,9E+14 
Allmaterials IB 1199.0 5,0E+19 1 ,7E+19 8,8E+18 9,8E+17 2,8E+14 
All material OB+IB 2619.4 1,3E+20 4,5E+19 2,3E+19 2,7E+18 6,7E+14 
To elaborate on the effect of the tritium which is time dependent the total activity for 
the outboard plus inboard versus decay time is plotted in Figure 3. 
Forthebreeder material both cases are shown, i.e., without any tritium and including 
the predicted amount of tritium retained in the breeder (1 0 g, Table 6). One can see 
that at 1 0 years after shutdown the small amount of tritium dominates the activity of 
the breeder by two orders of magnitude, although at a relatively low Ievei compared 
to steel. At short decay times (<1d) and very lang decay times (>100y) the influence 
of tritium is small. 
For the multiplier, too, the curves without and with tritium are plotted, the latter being 
adjusted to the predicted tritium content in beryllium of 1278 g (Table 6). Here, the 
effect of tritium on the total activity reaches more than two orders of magnitude in the 
time interval 1 to 10 years after shutdown, approaching the curves for MANET 
pertaining to the shield and manifold zone. 
For MANET the effect of tritium on the total activity is negligible, since the amount of 
tritium is small and the activity Ievei is rather high which is dominated by the material 
in the first wall and in the breeding zone. So the total activity in all blanket materials 
amounts to 1.3x1 020 Bq at time zero declining slowly for the first 10 years and 
thereafter more rapidly, irrespective of the tritium contained in the breeder and 
multiplier. 
lt is concluded that the total activity is dominated by the structural material 
(predominantly by that contained in the first wall and breeding zone ). The activity in 
the breeder is typically 3 to 4 orders of magnitude lower and the activity of the 
multiplier ranges in between, depending on the amount of tritium trapped. 
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Figure 3: Total activity in blanket materials (tritium adjusted to predicted amount) 
2.3.3 The dominating nuclides 
To give an overview of the dominating radioactive nuclides with respect to total 
activity and gamma dose rate those nuclides which contribute with more than 10 % 
to the activity or dose rate are compiled in Table 8 for technically relevant time 
intervals, e.g., operation, accident management, maintenance and repair, 
decommissioning, and long term disposal. For the breeder material most of the 
dominating nuclides (for instance Na-24, Ar-37, Fe-55 for activity or Mn-54, Sc-46, 
Co-60 for gamma dose rate) are produced from impurities specified for the FISPACT 
calculations. The isotope Al-26, however, which is of interest with regard to the long 
term gamma dose rate results from both the aluminum content as initial impurity (two 
thirds) and from transmutation from silicon (one third). The latter fraction cannot be 
avoided. 
ln the multiplier the basic constituent is beryllium with a small addition of oxygen. 
Again a large number of specified impurities are responsible for the dominating 
nuclides (like Fe-55, Ni-63, C-14 for activity and Na-24, Mn-56, Co-58, Co-60, Ag-
1 08 for gamma dose rate). The initial aluminum content is lower than in the breeder 
(about one sixth) and the silicon content is much lower (0.01 % vs. 23.2%) so that 
the Al-26 long term gamma dose rate ranks only second. 
ln the structural material MANET the nuclides of Fe, Mn, Ni, and Nb stem from 
alloying elements. Co is a specified impurity (0.02 %) but is to some extent (about 5 
% of the initial amount) produced from Fe and/or Ni. Tc is a product of the alloying 
element Mo. The contribution of Al (initial impurity 0.05 %) is insignificant in this 
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composition. So a reduction of manganese by at least two orders of magnitude, 
cobalt by at least one order of magnitude, and niobium by perhaps two orders of 
magnitude would be effective means to reduce the gamma dose rate of MANET. On 
the other hand in the time intervals relevant for maintenance and decommissioning 
Fe-55 is the strengestand unavoidable contributor to the activity in ferritic steel. 
TABLE 8: ACTIVITY AND GAMMA DOSE RA TE DOMINAT/NG NUCL/DES 
(SORTED ACCORDING TO THEIR IMPORTANCE) 
Time Interval Activity dominating nuclides 
Gamma dose rate 
dominating nuclides 
Breeder Multipl. Structur Breeder Multipl. Structur 
e e 
Os Al-28 He-6 Mn-56 N-16 N-16 Mn-56 
Operation Fe-55 Al-28 He-6 
10 s to 1 day Si-31 Fe-55 Mn-56 Na-24 Na-24 Mn-56 
Accident management Na-24 Fe-55 Mn-56 Mn-54 
Co-58 Co-60 
Co-60 
1 day to 1 year H-3 H-3 Fe-55 Mn-54 Co-58 Mn-54 
Maintenance and Na-24 Fe-55 Mn-54 Sc-46 Co-60 Co-60 
repair Ar-37 Co-58 Mn-54 
Fe-55 Zn-65 
1 year to 1 00 years H-3 H-3 Fe-55 Co-60 Co-60 Co-60 
Decommissioning Fe-55 Fe-55 Ni-63 Na-22 Ba-137 Nb-94 
Ar-39 Ni-63 Nb-93 Al-26 
> 100 years C-14 Be-10 Nb-94 Al-26 Ag-108 Nb-94 
Lang term disposal Cl-36 C-14 Tc-99 Al-26 
Nb-91 
Ni-59 
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3 ENERGY SOURCES FOR MOBILISATION 
Energy sources in upset or accidental conditions are seen in (a) plasma disruptions, 
(b) delayed plasma shutdown after cooling disturbances, (c) decay heat, (d) work 
potential for pressurised coolants, and (e) exotherrnie chemical reactions. This 
section summarises the energy sources for the BOT blanket based on the 
inventories described in 2. An overview of the energy sources (a) to (e) is given in 
Table 9. The values are elaborated in the subsections to follow. 
TABLE 9: ENERGY SOURCES FOR MOBILISA T/ON 
Energy source Value (GJ) 
Plasma disruptions (localised) ~1 
Delayed plasma shutdown 11 
Decay heat integrated over: 
1 minute 1.9 
1 hour 76 
1 day 370 
1 month 3900 
Work potential of helium coolant 
1 subsystem 11.2 
all subsystems 35.3 
Chemical energy potential 
beryllium/water reaction 12 000 
beryllium/oxygen reaction 21 200 
3.1 Energy liberated during plasma disruptions 
Plasma disruptions can cause local evaporation of first wall material or mobilisation 
of adhesive dust. This is a common and unresolved problern of first wall protection 
and dust processing and is not considered here. The energy source is essentially 
the stored energy in the plasma which is typically of the order of 1 GJ and, hence, is 
small compared to other energy sources discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2 Energy due to delayed plasmashutdown 
Delayed plasmashutdown after a sudden cooling disturbance will bring any first wall 
to melt within seconds. The energy source is essentially the time integral of the 
fusion power from the beginning of the cooling disturbance to complete shutdown. 
For instance, for the reference plasma shutdown scenario (plasma is shutdown 1 s 
after cooling disturbance; at that time the internal heat source disappears 
instantaneously and the first wall surface heat flux decreases linearly down to zero in 
20 s) the energy transmitted to the first wall is then 4.2 GJ and to the blanket 0.8 GJ 
per GW of fusion power (ignoring that a large fraction of the 4.2 GJ goes to the 
divertor). This scales up to 9.2 GJ to the first wall and 1.8 GJ into the blanket for a 
2.2 GW reactor. 
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3.3 Decay heat 
Decay heat is the governing feature in managing the cooling disturbances like 
LOCA, LOFA (Section 4) and, in particular, loss of site power or loss of heat sink. 
The decay heat has been assessed in the neutranies analyses [4] and is presented 
there as time dependent afterheat power density (per unit volume) and total 
afterheat per outboard and inboard blanket segment. Here we give additional 
information on specific afterheat (per unit mass), total afterheat, and adiabatic 
temperature rise in blanket domains referred to in this report, that is, in different 
blanket regions (inboard, outboard) and radial zones (first wall, breeding zone, 
manifold and shield zone) as specified in 2.1. 
3.3. 1 Specific afterheat 
The specific afterheat in the materials (breeder, multiplier, and steel) and for steel in 
the blanket domains mentioned is plotted in Figure 4 as a function of time after 
shutdown. The curves represent average values taken over the entire radial zone 
(thickness of radial zones as defined in Table 1) in the outboard (central part plus 
upper part) and, respectively, in the inboard (central partplus upper and lower part). 
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Figure 4: Specific afterheat in blanket materials in the outboard (OB) and inboard 
(18) in different radial zones, i.e., first wa/1 (FW), breeding zone (BZ), and 
manifold plus shield zone (SH). 
At time zero (after 20000 hours of operation) the specific afterheat for the three 
blanket materials of the breeding zone ranges between 18 W/kg for the steel (curve 
MANET, BZ, OB) and 57 W/kg for the breeder material. Note that for all pairs of 
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curves for inboard and outboard, except for the steel in the first wall, the average 
specific afterheat in the inboard is higher by a factor of between 1.2 and 3 than in 
the outboard. 
The time behaviour of the steel and the relation of the specific afterheat in the three 
radial zones is similar to that of the specific activity (Figure 2) with the typical 
decrease by one order of magnitude after 1 day. The specific afterheat in the 
breedermaterial startsoutat a high Ievei, however, after 1 minute it drops steadily in 
the log-log scale by five orders of magnitude within the first year. lt does not include 
the contribution from the retained tritium which is insignificant. The multiplier steps 
down by two orders of magnitude within the first minute and then declines gradually 
staying below the specific afterheat of the steel in the manifold and shield zone. 
ln a similar way as the averaged values discussed above also the corresponding 
values at the blanket midplane have been plotted (not shown) and all the qualitative 
results presented apply in the same way, of course at a higher Ievei. Values at the 
midplane are greater by typically a factor of 1.8 to 2.6 compared to the zone average 
values. 
3.3.2 Total afterheat 
The total afterheat of the blanket materials in the different regions and radial zones 
(Figure 5) has been evaluated by multiplying the average specific afterheat plotted in 
Figure 4 by the corresponding mass inventories listed in Table 7. The total afterheat 
in the blanket after decay times of Os, 1 h, 1 d, 1 month, 1 year amounts to 34, 16, 
1.7, 1.3, and 0.6 MW, respectively, 60 % of which is generated in the outboard and 
40 % in the inboard. The afterheat is dictated by the structural material (MANET) 
and among the three radial zones the first wall contributes most with its relatively 
small mass fraction. 
For thermal transient analyses on the time scale beyond a few minutes the 
contribution of the breeder and multiplier materials to the total afterheat can be 
neglected (Figure 5). As already discussed in 2.3.2 the curves for the breeder 
material do not contain the contribution from the trapped tritium, whereas the curves 
for the multiplier do include the full tritium produced in the beryllium (assuming zero 
release). As 1 g of tritium produces an afterheat of 0.327 W it becomes evident that 
the amounts of tritium predicted to be retained in the materials (Table 6) can be 
neglected in this context. 
From the curves for the total afterheat in the entire blanket (Figure 5, curve Iabeiied 
all materials OB+IB) we can estimate the decay energy integrated over typical time 
intervals of relevance in safety discussions in comparison to other energy sources 
for mobilisation. This accumulated decay energy amounts to 1.9 GJ after 1 minute 
rising up to 3900 GJ after 1 month (Table 9). 
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Figure 5: Total afterheat in blanket materials in the outboard (OB) and inboard (18) 
in different radial zones, i.e., first wa/1 (FW), breeding zone (BZ), and 
manifold plus shield zone (SH). 
3.3.3 Thermal inertia 
The heat capacity relative to the specific afterheat of a given material or a mixture of 
materials represents the thermal inertia of a given system. High thermal inertia Iimits 
temperature transients and amplitudes in upset or faulted conditions and, thereby, 
contributes inherently to Iimit potential consequences for primary initiating events 
and eases plant control. A measure for the thermal inertia (more precisely, of its 
inverse value) is the adiabatic temperature evolution of the isolated blanket or of 
portians of the blanket, like the radial zones or individual materials. lt can be 
described by equation 4 
where T 
h(t) 
dT h(t) 
-=--
dt cp(T) 
= mean temperature of the system 
= mean specific afterheat of the mixture (weighted by 
mass fractions) as function of time, t 
ep(T) = mean heat capacity of the mixture (temperature 
dependent and weighted by mass fractions) 
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(4) 
The resulting temperature vs. time curves are plotted in Figure 6 for various portians 
of the outboard blanket as indicated in the figure legend. ln computing equation 4 
the average specific afterheat according to Figure 4 was used for individual 
materials. 
The transient for the fictitious isolated first wall is the steepest, reaching a 
temperature rise of 237 K in the first hour. ln contrast, the isolated manifold and 
shield zone (without removable shield) would warm up very slowly (about 40 Kin the 
first day). Even smaller is the heat-up of the breeder material (7 K/day) and of the 
multiplier (4 Klday). Foramixture of the whole outboard blanket the temperature rise 
amounts to 137 K for the first day, levelling off to, e.g., 53 Klday at the end of the 
first 24 hours. Likewise the curve for the isolated breeding zone (mixture of steel, 
breeder material, and multiplier) is plotted, which is similar to the former. 
The same exercise has been done for the inboard and also for an isolated slice of 
material mixture taken from the blanket midplane, using the specific afterheat 
histories at midplane which are higher as discussed earlier. Typical results are 
tabulated in Table 10 for the four cases. 
ln general, one can conclude that the adiabatic temperature transients for isolated 
portians of the blanket are high for the first wall, moderate for the mixture and very 
low for the breeder material and multiplier. Tamperature transients for the inboard 
are higher than for the outboard (except in the first wall). Piease note that the 
temperature rise in the first wall can never reach the values quoted because of the 
thermal coupling with the breeding zone. lt may rather approach the curve obtained 
for the mixture of the whole blanket. 
TABLE 10: ADIABATIC TEMPERATURE RISE IN DIFFERENT PORTIONS OF THE 
BLANKET (in K after 1 day; in the first line in K after 1 hour) 
Blanket material and zone ln total radial zone ln a slice at midplane 
Outboard lnboard Outboard lnboard 
MANET, FW (after one hour) 237 214 475 426 
MANET, BZ 358 459 836 1030 
MANET, SH 41 50 74 106 
Breeder material, BZ 7 17 19 25 
Multiplier, BZ 4 ·6 9 11 
Total blanket (FW+BZ+SH) 137 132 296 280 
Total BZ (all materials) 116 162 269 355 
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Figure 6: Adiabatic temperature evolution of blanket materials and mixtures of 
materials in isolated radial zones of the outboard blanket. 
3.4 Work potential of helium coolant 
The work potential of the helium coolant, the release times in case of a double-
ended pipe break, and the momentum forces of the outflowing gas stream have been 
assessed analytically and by use of a simple RELAP model [5]. 
The main helium cooling system contains 22000 kg of helium at 8 MPa and 
inleUoutlet temperature of 250/450 oc, i.e., a mean temperature of about 350 °C. 
The work potential relative to ambient conditions for the total helium inventory is 35 
GJ. A more realistic scenario is the adiabatic expansion of the helium inventory from 
one outboard cooling subsystem, comprising six primary loops with an inventory of 
about 7000 kg (see 2.2). The corresponding work potential would be 11 GJ. Upon 
release this helium would pressurise the vacuum vessel (assuming a free volume of 
5000 m3) in the event of an in-vessel pipe rupture to 1.5 MPa. This is beyend the 
expected design pressure and, hence, would require an extra expansion volume. 
Assuming 0.2 MPa as an absolute end pressure, the required expansion volume 
would be 70000 m3. 
The release times for the helium of one of the two independent outboard cooling 
subsystems in the case of a double-ended break in pipe sections of different sizes 
were investigated. Analytical computations assuming reversible adiabatic expansion 
of the pressurised helium yielded draining times of 1. 8/2.9/46 s for inner pipe 
diameters of 1080/540/300 mm which are typical for the hot leg, circulator bypass, 
and feeders, respectively. 
To obtain an estimate of the effects of wall friction and heat transfer from the pipe 
walls to the helium during outflow, a simple RELAP model was established. The 
simulated pipe lengths were 1 00/1 00/30 m for the pipe diameters mentioned above. 
These are chosen as example with regard to the envisaged cooling circuits. 
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Computations with this model resulted in draining times of 2.5/4.3/72 s for the 
respective diameters. The Ionger release times are due to dissipation of kinetic 
energy by friction and due to decreasing density of the outflowing gas stream by 
heat supply from the pipe walls. Figura 7 shows the depressurization of one of the 
two outboard first wall cooling subsystems after a double-ended break in either the 
hot leg, circulator bypass, or in one feeder. 
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Figure 7: Depressurization of one of the two outboard cooling subsystems. Curves 
refer to a double-ended pipe break in eilher the hot leg (1080 mm), 
circulator bypass (540 mm), or in the feeder (300 mm). 
The momentum forces of the gas stream immediately at the beginning of the 
discharge were calculated according to the mass flows and velocities obtained with 
the RELAP model to 4220/1140/250 kN per side for the pipe diameters of 
1 080/540/300 mm. 
The minimum release time for the helium in case of a guillotine break of a single 
cooling channel in the first wall ( cross sectional area 14 mm x 18 mm, reversible 
adiabatic expansion) was estimated to 3.4 hours. This long time span is due to the 
small cross sectional area of a first wall cooling channel which Iimits the 
outstreaming mass flow to some kilograms per second. 
lt should be noted that there exists a potential for the release of the helium from both 
cooling subsystems at the sametime into the vacuum vessel in case of a crack in a 
segment box extending over adjacent cooling channels, each one pertaining to one 
cooling subsystem (see 5.2). Then the end pressure and expansion volume 
discussed above would be doubled if the failure occurred in an outboard first wall. A 
similar occurrence in the inboard first wall would have less consequences because 
of the smaller helium inventory. 
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3.5 Exotherrnie chemical reactions 
The largest chemical energy potential results from the vast amount of beryllium 
multiplier (R::300 tons). The exotherrnie reaction per ton of beryllium with water or 
oxygen generates 40 GJ or 67.4 GJ, respectively, resulting in a total chemical 
energy potential of 12000 GJ for a beryllium/water reaction and 21200 GJ for a 
berylliumfair reaction. This corresponds to between 1 00 and 300 GJ per blanket 
segment (Table 11 ). 
lt must be emphasised that the beryllium pebble beds are encapsulated in 
approximately 150 separate chambers per segment, so that the accessibility of the 
beryllium to chemical agents is small, as is its mobility (compare 5.2). 
TABLE 11: CHEMICAL ENERGY POTENTIAL PER BLANKET SEGMENT (GJ) 
Chemical reaction (at 600 °C) Outboard lnboard 
Beryllium/water reaction 179 105 
Beryllium/air reaction 301 177 
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4 FAULT TOLERANCE 
The following analyses of temperature transients during a lass of coolant and lass of 
flow accident and of the temperature profile during handling without active cooling 
have been performed in order to get a first idea of whether the BOT blanket is 
tolerant in accidental or abnormal conditions. 
4.1 loss of coolant accident 
Tamperature transients in the first wall of the outboard blanket were analysed for a 
loss of coolant accident (LOCA) [6]. The LOCA sequence has been defined as a 
working hypothesis for the BOT blanket as follows: Coolant flow is interrupted 
instantaneously at time zero in one of the two independent helium subsystems. 
Plasmashutdown is assumed at t=1 s. At the sametime the internal heat source in 
the blanket disappears instantaneously and the first wall surface heat flux decreases 
linearly down to zero within 20 s. 
The calculations were performed in two steps. ln the first step a rather coarse three-
dimensional mesh was used to compute the transient helium temperatures along 
typical coolant channels, applying the average value of the surface heat flux of 0.4 
MW/m2. ln the second step a finer two-dimensional mesh was used to compute the 
temperature distribution in the structure. Here the local peak surface heat flux of 0.5 
MW/m2 occurring at the blanket midplane was taken into account. Since it was found 
in the steady state calculations [7] that for this concept the heat exchange between 
the first wall and the breeding zone cannot be neglected, the models contain both a 
representative part of the first wall and of the adjacent breeding zone consisting of 
the attached cooling plate and portians of the pebble beds (Figure 8). The boundary 
of the model representing the beryllium pebble bed has been chosen such that the 
temperature contour lines are approximately normal to the boundary which means 
zero heat flux as boundary condition. 
The temperature history at three selected points of the first wall during the transient 
is plotted in Figure 8. The maximum temperature is reached at the edge of the 
segment in the equatorial midplane, opposing the failed cooling channel (point A). lts 
peak value is 590 oc (70 K above the steady state temperature) occurring 1 0 s after 
LOCA initiation. Tamperatures in the other points next to the rib (point B) and 
opposite to the intact cooling channel (point C) immediately start to decrease. 
A transient stress analysis has not been carried out so far. The yield strength and 
the ultimate tensile strength of the structural material MANET at the peak 
temperature (590 °C) are reduced by 20 % compared to the values at Operating 
temperature (520 °C). The stress analysis for steady state conditions [7] resulted in 
stresses weil below the admissible values according to the ASME code. lt can be 
assumed that the primary stresses do not increase significantly during the transient 
and that the secondary stress amplitudes occur locally. Hence, the short-term 
temperature transients are not expected to endanger the integrity of the structure. 
However further investigations are needed. 
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Figure 8: Temperature history at three points of the first wa/1 during a LOCA (fett) 
and temperature distribution across the first wa/1 plus breeding zone 
model at t=10 s (right). 
4.2 loss of flow accident 
Tamperature transients in the first wall of the outboard blanket were analysed for a 
loss of flow accident (LOFA) in a similar way as described in 4.1 for the LOCA, using 
the same geometrical model shown in Figure 8 [6]. For the LOFA sequence it has 
been assumed that the mass flow rate in both cooling subsystems decreases linearly 
down to 1 % of its nominal value within 4 s after the start of the accident at t=O s. 
The history of the heat Ioads is the same as in the case of a LOCA. 
The temperature history at three selected points of the first wall during the transient 
is plotted in Figure 9. The maximum temperature is reached at the edge of the 
segment in the equatorial midplane, opposing the failed cooling channel with the 
higher initial temperature (point A). lts peak value is 565 oc ( 45 K above the steady 
state temperature) occurring 14 s after LOFA initiation. Tamperatures in the other 
points next to the rib (point B) and opposite to U1e other failed cooling channel (point 
C) show a similar behaviour, namely: until about 3 s the shut-off internal heat Ioad 
Ieads to a temporal temperature drop. Then the surface heat flux, declining slower 
than the mass flow rate, causes the temperature hump at t=14 s. 
Also shown in Figure 9 is the history of the coolant temperature during the first 60 s 
at the inlet, at the centre, and at the outlet of the plasma facing part of the first wall. 
One can see that at t=14 s the coolant temperatures are still rising. The fact that the 
first wall temperatures at this time start to drop is caused by further decreasing 
surface heat flux and by temperature balance within the model. lt is to be noted that 
the subsequent temperature development in the first wall and in the whole blanket 
depends on the afterheat production discussed in 3.3 and on the ascribed cooling 
conditions (natural circulation, heat dissipation to surrounding structures). Those 
long term transients have still to be assessed. They can exceed the short term 
temperature peaks regarded here. 
The generated thermal stresses have not been assessed. They are smaller than in 
the case of LOCA due to the smaller temperature amplitudes and gradients. 
24 S&E Impact of the BOT Blanket 
565 .440 
T["CJ outlet 
400 550 
A 
mid 
c 360 S3S 
S20 320 B 
inld 
SOS 280 
490 240 
0 4 8 12 16 t[s] 20 0 12 24 36 48 t[3J 60 
Figure 9: Tamperature history at three points (compare Figure 8) of the first wa/1 
during a LOFA (left) and history of the coolant temperature in the plasma 
facing part of the first wa/1 (right). 
4.3 Temperature distribution in a segment du ring handling 
Within the blanket concept selection exercise performed for the four European 
blanket concepts the question arose, whether active cooling of the blanket segments 
during handling is required or not. To answer this question for the BOT solid breeder 
blanket, calculations with the finite element code FIDAP [8] were performed. 
The calculations were performed using the model shown in Figure 10. lt is a 
poloidal-radial cut through the toroidal midplane of an outboard blanket segment. ln 
poloidal direction the model is bounded by cuts through the centre of the beryllium 
and Li4Si04 pebble beds, respectively, which were assumed to be adiabatic 
boundaries. ln radial direction the model includes the first wall, the breeding zone 
with one cooling plate, and the manifolding zone consisting in the simplified model of 
an air filled gap and the back plate. Heat is only dissipated by convection and 
radiation from the front side, whereas the side walls as weil as the rear side are set 
as adiabatic boundaries. The heat transfer within the pebble beds (both conduction 
and heat resistance at pebble bed/solid structure interfaces) was modellad based on 
correlations developed in [9]. ln the air filled gap conduction and convection by 
natural circulation in a closed vertical cavity [1 0] was considered. As heat sources 
the radial profiles of afterheat generated in the different materials one day after 
shutdown were used according to the neutranies analyses [4]. 
Two calculations were carried out. ln the first case heat transfer across the front wall 
due to convection and radiation (emissivity =1) was considered. ln the secend case 
only convection was taken into account. The equilibrium temperature profile in radial 
direction for the first case is shown in Figure 10. 1t rang es from 300 oc at the front 
side to 420 oc at the rear side, involving a significant temperature jump of about 40 
K in the air filled gap. ln the secend case the temperature profile Iooks similar, 
however due to the neglect of the heat Iosses by radiation, it is shifted to a higher 
Ievei, that is, the temperature would now range between 7 40 oc and 830 °C. 
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The analysis shows that the afterheat generated in an outboard segment one day 
after shutdown can be dissipated by convection and radiation via the front wall alone 
in an air environment of 30 oc, without exceeding acceptable temperature Iimits in 
the structure (case 1 ). The comparison with case 2 shows that the contribution from 
radiation is substantial and must not be neglected in the assessment. The analysis 
implies a number of conservative assumptions, i.e., the adiabatic side walls, the 
adiabatic back wall, and the air filled gap which will more likely be filled with helium. 
On the other hand, the emissivity will perhaps be much less than unity. Overall, 
active cooling of a segment during handling will not be required by all means, 
although it would ease the temperature control in terms of profile and Ievei. 
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Figure 10: Radial temperature profile in the outboard blanket segment during 
handling. Heat is dissipated at the front wa/1 by convection and radiation 
(left). Radial-poloidal model used in FIDAP calculations (right). 
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5 TRITIUM AND ACTIVATION PRODUCTS RELEASE 
5.1 Release during normal operation 
ln normal operation the total release of tritium and activation products to the 
environment should not exceed 1 TBq/d as a guide line. The release is expected to 
be dominated by the effluents arising from the primary helium cooling loops via 
permeation in the steam generators into the secondary water/steam cycle. For these 
discharges an upper Iimit of 20 Ci/d (0.74 TBq/d) has been estimated [1] based on 
the assumptions made in [11] (incoloy 800 steam generator tubes with a barrier 
factor of 20). This leaves little margin for other effluents, for instance originating from 
coolant leakage (into the containment and from there via the plant air detritiation 
system to the environment), from the purge gas system, and from other fuel cycle 
equipment. These have not been assessed here, but conservative estimates 
performed in the safety and environmental assessment of fusion power (SEAFP) 
indicate that they may also range up to close to 1 TBq/d so that the total release 
would exceed the 1 TBq/d goal. Further assessment is needed in this area. 
5.2 Tritium release in accidental Situations 
For a first judgement on the radiological hazard potential of the tritium an 
assessment has been made on the early dose and ehrenie dose to the most exposed 
individual at a distance of 1 km from the point of release caused by the tritium 
inventory. Part of the tritiumwill escape into the vacuum vessel and from there to the 
environment in the case of a postulated severe loss of coolant accident (rupture of 
the first wall involving both cooling subsystems). ln this section the tritium release 
from the primary coolant, from the purge gas, and from the ejected amount of 
beryllium pebbles is considered and the radiological consequences are discussed. 
The accident scenario postulated which could be considered as an enveloping 
design basis accident is defined as follows: 
• Rupture of the first wall of one outboard segment in toroidal direction across the 
whole segment width and the full first wall depth 
• Escape of primary helium from both subsystems into the vacuum vessel 
• Ejection of multiplier from the affected segment chamber of 45 mm height (~0 kg 
of beryllium) into the vacuum vessel 
• Venting of the vacuum vessel into the expansion volume, end pressure <0.2 MPa 
• Escape of total (original) purge gas into vacuum vessel and expansion volume 
and refill of purge gas system to vacuum vessel end pressure 
• Air or water ingress into vacuum vessel 
• Chemical reaction of ejected multiplier and release of tritium into vacuum vessel 
and expansion volume 
• Release of tritium from breeder and multiplier pebbles from the whole outboard 
blanket ( except affected chamber) into purge gas due to temperature transients; 
flushing of a fraction of the released tritium into the vacuum vessel before 
isolation of affected segment 
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<~~ Isolation of affected segment from purge gas system within about 1 hour 
• Afterheat removal from outboard blanket (including the affected segment) by main 
cooling systems at low pressure. 
The amount of tritium escaping into the vacuum vessel and expansion volume is 
summarised in Table 12. 
TABLE 12: TRITIUM ESCAPING INTO THE VACUUM VESSEL IN GASE OF A 
POSTULATED FIRST WALL RUPTURE 
Tritium carrying system or Totaltritium Fraction Tritium 
component inventory escaping into escaping into 
(g) Vac. Vessel Vac. Vessel (g) 
Primary coolant (helium) 0.46 0.62 0.29 
Purge gas (helium) 0.1 1 0.1 
Multiplier ejected (beryllium) 0.4 1 0.4 
Multiplier in affected segment 20 0.05 1 
Multiplier in remainder blanket 1258 0.003 3.8 
Breeder in affected segment 0.15 0.5 0.08 
Breeder in remainder blanket 10 0.05 0.5 
Total 6.2 
The following explanations are given: 
- The primary coolant has a total tritium inventory of 0.46 g (Table 6) in 22000 kg of 
helium. The two subsystems affected contain 62 % of the total inventory, that is 
0.29 g of tritium in about 14000 kg of helium. 
- The purge gas carries in steady state a tritium inventory of approximately 0.1 g 
(2.3.1) in a single and interconnected system for the whole blanket. lt is assumed 
that all the tritium is released into the vacuum vessel. 
- The ejected beryllium from one chamber (40 kg) contains about 0.4 g of tritium. 
Due to the postulated chemical reaction all the tritium is assumed to be liberated 
into the vacuum vessel. 
- The tritium retained in the beryllium of the affected segment amounts to about 20 
g. lt is assumed that during the temperature transient 5 % of the tritium (3 % 
corresponding to the initial burst predicted in [2] plus modelling uncertainties) will 
be released into the purge gas and from there into the vacuum vessel. 
- The tritium inventory in the beryllium of the remainder of the blanket amounts to 
1258 g (1278 g according to 2.3.1 minus 20 g). lt is assumed that during the 
accident 3% of the tritium content is released from the beryllium (according to the 
initial burst) into the purge gas and 1 0 % of that released fraction has escaped 
into the vacuum vessel before the isolation of the affected segment from the purge 
gas system was achieved. 
28 S&E Impact of the BOT Blanket 
- The tritium retained in the breeder material of the affected segment amounts to 
about 0.15 g. lt is assumed that during the temperature transient 50 % of the 
tritiumwill be released into the purge gas and from there into the vacuum vessel. 
- The tritium inventory in the breeder material of the remainder of the blanket 
amounts to 10 g (Table 6). lt is assumed that during the accident 50 % of the 
tritium content is released from the breeder pebbles into the purge gas and 10 % 
of that released fraction has migrated into the vacuum vessel before the isolation 
of the affected segment from the purge gas system was achieved. 
Under this Supposition the total amount of tritium escaping into the vacuum vessel 
and expansion volume as gaseaus effluent accumulates to 6.2 g, 84 % of which 
being liberated from the beryllium alone. Most of the tritiumwill be released from the 
breeder and multiplier in the form of HT. However a large fraction is expected to be 
chemically reduced to HTO at the steel walls before leaving the blanket. So for the 
assessment of the doserate to the public it would be conservative to assume that all 
the tritium were present in the form of HTO, the more dose effective form compared 
to HT. 
To compute the early dose and the ehrenie dose to the most exposed individual at a 
distance of 1 km from the point of release, credit can be taken of a containment 
retention factor, fR<1, saying that only a fraction fR of the tritium escaped into the 
vacuum vessel and expansion volume will be released to the environment. 
Moreover, for the early dose (ED, 7 days exposure plus 50 years integration, no 
ingestion) a conversion factor of 0.26 mSv/g-T released to the environment and for 
the ehrenie dose (EDE, 50 years exposure plus 50 years integration, with ingestion) 
a conversion factor of 1.6 mSv/g-T are used according to [12] for a first assessment. 
These factors vary with the assumptions made for the release seenarios by about 3 
orders of magnitude as investigated in [13] and the chosen values range close to the 
upper bound (of 1 mSv/g-T for ED and 4 mSv/g-T for EDE). Applying these 
conversion factors and a containment retention factor of fR=0.01 we obtain with the 
total tritium of 6.2 g from Table 12 (and hence 0.062 g released to the environment) 
the following doses: 
Early Dose= 0.016 mSv 
Chronic Dose = 0.1 mSv 
Thus, the predicted early dose and ehrenie dose caused by tritium release in this 
conservative accident scenario are Iew. The tolerable dose Iimits on the other hand 
are still under discussion and the spectrum of national regulations is rather wide. 
Recent recommendations discussed in ITER for various classes of event sequences 
range from 0.1 mSv/a for likely sequences (f<10-2/a) over 5 mSv/event for unlikely 
sequences (10-2/a > f > 10-4/a) to 5-50 mSv/event for extremely unlikely sequences 
(1 04 /a > f >1 0-6/a), where f is the rate of occurrence. ln the SEAFP study [14] a value 
of 100 mSv/event is suggested as a yardstick with the understanding that doses of 
this Ievei trigger the consideration of evacuation but do not mandate it. 
5.3 Activation products release 
Activation products release to the environment has not been assessed for the BOT 
blanket. The set of accident seenarios investigated in SEAFP [14] show that the 
maximum early dose to the most exposed member of the public are rather small. lt 
ranges from 1.5E-7 mSv to 6.6E-4 mSv for the design basis accidents (DBA) and 
Tritium and activation products release 29 
from 7.5E-7 to 2.4E-1 mSv for the postulated beyend design basis aeeidents 
(BDBA). Corresponding values for the maximum ehrenie dose are higher by up to 
more than two orders of magnitude, viz. 2.6E-6 to 1.3E-1 mSv for DBAs and 3.7E-5 
to 21 mSv for BDBAs. lt is to be emphasised that in all the eases eonsidered in the 
SEAFP study the largest eontribution to the dose values stated originate from souree 
terms whieh arenot blanket eoneept speeifie (namely dust aerosols from beryllium or 
tungsten as first wall proteetion material), or from aerosols in the water eoolant whieh 
is not applieable to the BOT eoneept. Henee, a similar assessment performed for the 
BOT blanket as was done in SEAFP would perhaps result in early doses mueh less 
than 1 mSv andin ehrenie doses also below 1 mSv. Again, most of these doses are 
expeeted to result from the first wall proteetion material, espeeially in the case of 
tungsten. 
ln eonelusion, the aetivation produets release phenomena need further analyses. 
Results from the SEAFP study suggest that the dose Ieveis may range in the same 
order of magnitude as obtained in 5.2 for tritium release, but all being weil below 
tolerable dose Iimits referred to in 5.2. 
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6 WASTE GENERATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Only the decommissioning waste (no oparational waste) is considered here. The 
masses and volumes for the different blanket materials produced by one complete 
set of blankets with the dimensions defined in Table 1 are given in Table 13, along 
with the total radioactive inventory and typical afterheat power densities at different 
decay times. The data have been compiled from the FISPACT calculations 
described in [4]. The volumes and power densities quoted refer to compact materials 
without any void volume. For the breeder and multiplier material the activity and 
power density are given for two cases, viz. a) without any tritium and b) including the 
predicted amount of tritium according to Table 6. This is because the influence of the 
tritium is substantial and for decommissioning purposes it is conceivable to remove 
most of the tritium from the Li4Si04 and beryllium by baking. 
TABLE 13: RADIOACTIVE INVENTORY AND AFTERHEAT IN ONE SET OF 
BLANKET SEGMENTS AT DIFFERENT DECA Y TIMES (20000 HOURS 
OF FULL POWER OPERA Tl ON, ROUNDED NUMBERS) 
Blanke! Malerial Total Compact Total Radioaclivity in Bq Decay Heat (kW/m3) 
orZone Mass Volume after after 
(Ions) (m3) 1 y 10y 100 y 105 y 1 y 10y 
Breeder incl. 1 0 g of trilium 75 31 4E+15 2E+15 3E+13 8E+09 8,7E-04 3,3E-04 
Breeder excl. tritium 75 31 3E+14 4E+13 1 E+13 8E+09 5,1 E-04 1,8E-04 
Multiplier incl. 1278 g of tritium 300 161 4E+17 3E+17 2E+15 6E+11 5,4E-03 2,2E-03 
Multiplier excl. tritium 300 161 5E+15 5E+14 3E+12 6E+11 1 ,9E-03 4,3E-04 
Structural material total 2250 292 2E+19 2E+18 1 E+15 2E+13 1,4E+OO 1 ,5E-01 
First wall incl. tritium 114 15 1E+19 1E+18 4E+14 4E+12 1 ,2E+01 6,0E-01 
Breeding zone lncl. tritium 600 78 1E+19 9E+17 6E+14 9E+12 3,5E+OO 3,4E-01 
Manifold&Shield zone incl. H-3 1540 200 2E+18 2E+17 3E+14 4E+12 4,0E-01 7,8E-02 
The total activity of the 75 tons of breeder material is the lowest of all materials, 
ranging from 3E 14 Bq after 1 year to 8E9 Bq after 1 05 years, if all the tritium were 
removed. Rests of tritium would increase the activity by up to . two orders of 
magnitude for the first decades. The afterheat power density is also very low ( <0. 9 
W/m3 after 1 year of decay) as is the gamma dose rate (<10-3 Sv/h in the 50- 100 
years time scale [4]). As already outlined in 2.3.3 most of the dominating nuclides 
are produced from impurities, but the very lang term gamma dose rate seems to be 
determined by Al-26, being both a product of the original aluminum impurity (0.158 
% by weight) and from transmutation of silicon. 
The 300 tons of be~llium multiplier carry an activity of between 5E15 Bq after 1 year 
to 6E11 Bq after 10 years, if all the tritium were removed. With the predicted amount 
of 1278 g of tritium the activity is higher by up to 3 orders of magnitude in the first 
century after shutdown. Hence, the actual activity will be determined by the degree 
of detritiation that can be achieved. The afterheat one year after shutdown amounts 
to a few W/m3 only. The lang term gammadoserate is governed by the nuclides Ag-
1 08 and Al-26. lt ranges araund 3E-5 Sv/h, depending on the initial impurities 
specified. However, there is a substantial amount of alpha emitters ( on the order of 
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5E+5 Bq/g after 10 years) coming from the specified uranium impurity (0.011 weight 
-%). 
The total amount of radioactivity in the blanket structure (MANET) sums up to 2E19 
Bq after 1 year for all outboard and inboard segments, declining by 4 orders of 
magnitude within 100 years (Table 13). Approximately one half of the activity resides 
in the small volume of the first wall ( 15 m3) and only about 10 % in the I arge volume 
of the removable shield (inboard only) and manifold zone. Accordingly, the averaged 
afterheat power density at 1 year varies between 12000 W/m3 in the first wall and 
400 W/m in the manifold and shield zone. The gamma dose rate after 100 years 
varies in the range of 0.1 Sv/h for the first wall to 0.01 Sv/h for the manifold and 
shield material. 
There is no universal classification scheme for radioactive waste available, since 
allowable Ieveis will depend on the actual radioactive waste management option and 
the properties of individual radionuclides. However, based on current international 
practice IAEA has prepared a safety guide [15] which outlines typical characteristics 
of waste classes as an orientation. To give an idea of what these classes are and 
how the different material groups would fit in, Table 14 summarises typical activity 
and afterheat data for a decay period of 1 0 years. The bottarn line of the table marks 
the IAEA interpretation of the boundary between high Ievei waste (HLW) and low 
and intermediate Ievei waste (LILW) [15]. For the LILW there is a subdivision 
between short lived waste (LILW-SL) and lang lived waste (LILW-LL). The LILW-SL 
has a Iimitation of long-lived alpha-emitting radionuclides to 4000 Bq/g in individual 
waste packages and may require either near surface or geological disposal facilities. 
The LILW-LL and of course the HLW require geological disposal. 
TABLE 14: ACTIVITY AND AFTERHEAT IN STRUCTURAL MATERIAL AFTER 10 
YEARS OF DECAY AND IAEA WASTE CLASSIFICATION 
BOUNDARIES 
Activity Afterheat Activity (Bq/g) 
(TBq/m3) (kW/m3) Total from alphas 
Breeder incl. 10 g of tritium 7E+01 0.0003 3E+07 ~o 
Multiplier incl. 1278 g of tritium 2E+03 0.002 1E+09 5E+05 
First wall incl. tritium 6E+04 0.6 8E+09 ~o 
Breeding zone incl. tritium 1E+04 0.3 2E+09 ~o 
Manifold&Shield zone incl. H-3 8E+02 0.08 1E+08 ~o 
IAEA HLW/LILW boundary ~ 5E+04 ~2 for alpha emitters 
interpretation LILW-SL: <4E+03 
LILW-LL: >4E+03 
32 S&E Impact of the BOT Blanket 
Applying this waste classification scheme one can draw the following conclusions: 
- The breeder has a specific activity and afterheat weil below the HLW/LILW 
boundary (by 3 and 4 orders of magnitude, respectively) and can be classified as 
LILW. Since there are practically no alpha emitters it is supposed to be qualified 
as short lived waste (LILW-SL). 
- The multiplier has a specific activity one order of magnitude and an afterheat 3 
orders of magnitude below the HLW/LILW boundary and can also be classified as 
LILW. There are substantial alpha emitters which call for a qualification as lang 
lived waste (LILW-LL). 
- The first wall structural material is close to the HLVv/LILW boundary in terms of 
the specific activity which further decays substantially in the next decades. Also 
the afterheat is below the Iimit and according to FISPACT calculations there are 
no alpha emitting nuclides, so that formally the classification as LILW-SL would 
be fulfilled. The lang term gamma dose rate may call for a classification as lang 
lived waste. 
- The activation data of the majority of the structural material from the breeding 
zone and particularly from the manifold and shield zone are weil below the 
HLW/LILW boundary and again there are no significant alpha emitters. The 
problern of gamma dose rate is somewhat alleviated compared to the first wall 
material but not decisively. 
- All material groups will require shielding during handling and transportation, since 
their gamma dose rate exceeds the frequently used hands-on Iimit of 2.5E-5 Sv/h 
by several orders of magnitude for decades 
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report summarises the safety considerations for the Karlsruhe breeder outside 
tube (BOT) type solid breeder blanket, performed essentially in the frame of the 
European blanket concept selection exercise. lt covers the topics (a) blanket 
materials and toxic materials inventory, (b) energy sources for mobilisation, (c) fault 
tolerance, ( d) tritium and activation products release, and ( e) waste generation and 
management. The assessment is based on a cooling system Iayout comprising a 
total of 18 circuits which are arranged in two 2-out-of 6 subsystems for the outboard 
plus two 2-out-of 3 subsystems serving the inboard. The terms 2-out-of-6 and 2-out-
of-3 mean that two circuits of a subsystem rnust fail for the plant to be unavailable. 
The results are summarised below, conclusions with regard to further investigations 
needed are drawn in 7.2. 
7.1 Summary of results 
Blanket materials and toxic materials inventory: The total blanket volume (all 
inboard and outboard segments, full toroidal coverage) amounts to 823 m3 with 
fractions of 36/4/20 percent for steel/breeder/beryllium, the rest of 15/7/19 percent 
for primary helium/purge helium/void. The loop arrangements account for 
redundancies, leading to an ovarpower capacity of 28 % from nominal. The total 
helium inventory in the cooling system amounts to 22 tons, with 7 tons in the largest 
subsystem. The total mass of beryllium in all blanket segments amounts to 300 tons. 
The tritium inventory in the fluids (helium coolant and purge gas) is small, i.e., less 
than 1 g. ln the solids (breeder and structural material) it is moderate, approximately 
10 g each in the Li4Si04 and in the MANET. However, a I arge tritium content of about 
1300 g is trapped in the 300 tons of beryllium multiplier. The total activity in all 
blanket materials amounts to 1.3x1 020 Bq at shutdown. lt is dominated by the 
structural material (predominantly by that contained in the first wall and breeding 
zone ). The activity in the breeder material is typically 3 to 4 orders of magnitude 
lower and the activity in the multiplier ranges in between, depending on the amount 
of tritium trapped. The dominafing nuclides in terms of activity and gamma dose rate 
at different time intervals are summarised in Table 8. 
Energy sources for mobilisation: The main energy sources for mobilisation result 
from decay heat and work potential of helium (Table 9). The chemical energy 
potential of beryllium is extremely high but a large scale chemical reaction is hardly 
conceivable. The decay heat would cause fictitious adiabatic temperature rises in 
isolated parts of the blanket of about 240-480 K in the first hour in the first wall, 40-
100 K in the first day in the shield and manifold region, <25 K in the first day in the 
breeder material, and <11 Kin the first day in the multiplier. An intimate mixture of all 
materials in the blanket would heat up ~135 Kin the first day (Table 1 0). 
The helium inventory frorn one outboard cooling subsystern would pressurise the 
vacuum vessel in case of a LOCA to 1.5 MPa. This is beyond the expected design 
pressure and requires an extra expansion volume of around 70000 m3 , assuming 0.2 
MPa end pressure. The release times are short (few seconds) and the momentum 
forces of a double-ended major pipe break are high (up to 4200 kN per side). ln the 
case of a first wall failure the helium would be released from both cooling 
subsystems at the same time. 
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Fault tolerance: Short term LOCA temperature excursions in the blanket structure 
are on the order of 70 K above steady state Ieveis. They are not expected to 
threaten the blanket integrity, but further investigations are needed. Similar analyses 
foralass of flow accident (LOFA) yielded even smaller temperature amplitudes. 
Active cooling of a blanket segment during handling is not required from the internal 
temperature distribution point of view, if the free convection surrounding gas (air or 
helium) can be kept at a temperature Ievei araund the normal ambient temperature. 
Tritium and activation products release: The early and ehrenie dose for a 
conservative tritium release scenario in case of a postulated accident (rupture of a 
first wall) have been estimated tobe about 0.02 mSv and 0.1 mSv, respectively. This 
is below currently discussed tolerable dose Iimits. The release of activation products 
has not been assessed. Results from Iiterature suggest that the dose Ieveis may 
range in the same order of magnitude as those obtained for tritium release. Further 
work is needed in this field. 
Waste generation: The specific activity and the afterheat of the blanket materials in 
different radial zones have been assessed and compared with the latest IAEA waste 
classification scheme. The 75 tons of breedermaterial are supposed to be qualified 
as short-lived low and intermediate Ievei (LILW-SL) waste. The beryllium multiplier is 
expected to be qualified as long-lived low and intermediate Ievei (LILW-LL) waste. 
The first wall structural material is close to the boundary between high Ievei waste 
(HLW) and LILW. The majority of the structural material is weil below the HLW/LILW 
boundary but has a Iang-term gamma dose rate. All material groups will require 
shielding during handling and transportation. 
7.2 Conclusions 
No insurmountable safety problems have been identified for the breeder outside 
tube blanket concept. Overall, the safety and environmental impact has been judged 
to be of almest the same Ievei as the one evaluated for the other three European 
DEMO blanket concepts [16]. Nevertheless, a number of concerns need further 
investigations or optimisation in the five areas addressed. 
Blanket materials and toxic materials inventory: The nominal tritium inventory in 
fluids is small and does not raise severe safety concerns for the public in accidental 
situations. On the other hand, minimisation of the routine release via steam 
generators relies on permeation barriers at the tube bundle. The effectiveness, 
reliability and durability have still to be proved. Oparational tritium Iosses through 
pipe walls, component walls and from leakage have not been elucidated but need 
attention. All those effects are governed by the tritium transport through the first wall 
into the primary helium coolant which carries large uncertainties and needs further 
research. 
Besides the tritium a certain amount of sputtered and eroded activation products 
from the channel walls will be carried by the main coolant and by the purge gas. The 
generation, transport, deposition behaviour, and means for on-line removal of such 
products have to be studied. ln this context the issue of developing low activation 
structural material is to be seen. Also the potential and technical means to minimise 
the impurities in the beryllium multiplier (like Co, Al, Fe, Mn, U) have to be 
elaborated. 
Energy sources for mobilisation: The main energy sources for mobilisation result 
from afterheat and work potential of helium. The afterheat is dominated by the decay 
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in the structural material rather than in the breeder and multiplier. The heat 
generation is moderate relative to the heat capacity of the system (leading to a high 
thermal inertia) and can easily be rejected by one of the two separate cooling 
systems connected to each segment. lt is expected, but needs tobe proved, that this 
is also true in the case of natural convection circulation, particularly at reduced 
system pressure. 
The work potential of the helium coolant is large and requires an extra expansion 
volume for the case of a LOCA. To cope with pressure transients in the vacuum 
vessel and other containment compartments a containment strategy and accident 
management strategy ( definition of primary initiating events, allocation of expansion 
volumes, possibility of venting, effectiveness of flow restrictors in combination with 
isolation valves) have tobe developed. 
The large chemical energy potential of beryllium in conjunction with the large amount 
of tritium trapped calls for investigations into chemical reaction kinetics of beryllium 
pebbles for conceivable failure sequences, like water or air entrainment via the 
purge gas system or the primary cooling system. 
Fault tolerance: Stresses induced by disruptions have not been addressed in this 
report but were assessed in the blanket selection exercise. They do not seem to 
create severe safety concerns at the present state of knowledge. However, large 
uncertainties still exist in the modelling assumptions with regard to physics 
phenomena, mechanical boundary conditions, design features, effect of poloidal field 
coils, and material strength. Further R&D is needed which is not specific to a 
particular blanket concept. 
Short term temperature transients for the LOCA cases investigated are moderate 
but the seenarios are to be extended to LOCAs occurring simultaneously in two 
cooling subsystems, and to further LOFA cases. The latter cases imply also the 
transition periods to achieve natural circulation heat transfer. Since the average 
specific afterheat is higher in the inboard segments than in the outboard segments 
the analysis should be extended to the inboard. ln these studies the effects of 
fabrication tolerances, modelling uncertainties, and partial plugging on flow 
maldistribution in multiple parallel coolant channels need to be considered. 
Tritium and activation products release: Some of the inventory and, hence, 
release issues have already been addressed in the first paragraph of the 
conclusions. The release seenarios have to be elaborated aiming at reducing overly 
conservative assumptions. ln general, this complex is not considered critical for 
design basis accidents, but beyend design basis accidents seenarios have to be 
taken into account. Note that in the whole blanket selection exercise the issues 
related to the first wall material (chemical reaction, tritium Iiberation, dust) have been 
deliberately ignored. 
Waste generation: Establishing rules for waste classification is a matter of national 
policy. According to the IAEA safety guide line, all but the first wall structural material 
can be classified as low and intermediate Ievei waste. A further reduction of the 
waste problern is the objective of the world-wide effort in developing low activation 
materials. Beryllium and breeder materials are envisaged for recycling. Adequate 
techniques have yet to be developed. 
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